OFF TO ELBA!1 THE LEGITIMACY OF SEX OFFENDER
RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
BY: JOSEPH L. LESTER*
There are times when politicians are hostages to the lusts of their constituents.
They dare not oppose bills that, if defeated, would serve only to aggravate those who
placed them into office.2 Regardless of whether they actually favor the measures, the
political risk is too great not to allow their constituents’ passions to overrun their own
common sense. As a consequence, laws are passed with little or no resistance.3 These
laws can fundamentally alter the liberties and freedom of a few to satisfy the ignorant
fear of the masses. As a result, laws that in theory appear to protect society, in practice
only exacerbate the perceived problem. In situations like this, an independent judiciary
must do what needs to be done. Because sometimes the desire of the majority overbears
individual liberty, it is critical that the courts protect the legitimate interests of "the
others."4 When such laws are passed and the political process is broken, it is necessary
for the judicial branch to step forward and protect those who are politically impotent.5
When it comes to laws that involve sex offenders, the passions of the majority
must be tempered with reason. Overborne by a mob mentality for justice, officials at
every level of government are enacting laws that effectively exile convicted sex offenders
from their midst with little contemplation as to the appropriateness or constitutionality of
their actions. Politicians across the country will approve almost any measure that deals
with sex offenders to appear strong on crime.6 Given that the sex offender lobby is
neither large nor vocal, it will be up to the courts to protect the interests of this
disenfranchised group.7
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Elba is the island Napoleon was exiled to until his attempt to retake the French Crown to which he was
sent to St. Helena to live in exile the remaining six years of his life.
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See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529-530
(2001).
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See e.g., In Georgia, 2006 H.B. 1059, which radically limited the areas that a sex offender could live and
work passed the State Senate 52 to 1. Available at
<<http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/sum/hb1059.htm>>; John Curran (Associated Press), Sexoffender Zones Assailed, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER Aug. 22, 2005, (The town of Brick, New Jersey,
included school bus stops in its list of locations an offender is prohibited from living 2,500 feet from. With
more than 2,000 bus stops, the measure effectively bars offenders from living anywhere in the town. “It’s
pretty tough, if someone introduces an ordinance like this, to vote no,” said Brick Mayor Joseph Scarpelli.
“I know they’ll probably have a case that tests all these ordinances, and there’s a good possibility a lot will
be thrown out as unconstitutional. But it makes a town feel that they care about their children.”)
4
See <<http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/themes/other.html>>
5
See Wayne A. Logan, "Democratic Despotism" and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical Analysis of
Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 495-496 (2004).
6
Lee Rood, New Data Shows Twice as Many Sex Offenders Missing, DES MOINES REGISTER AND TRIBUNE,
Jan. 22, 2006. Quoting state Sen. Dick Deardon, Dem. “it will be difficult to change. ‘No one wants a
postcard to come out two weeks before the election saying they are lax on sex offenders.'" Id.
7
Relying on politicians to act against their constituents' wishes to benefit an unpopular minority is wishful
thinking. "There is little legislative hay to be made in cultivating the multiple murderer vote." Cal. Dep't of
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 522 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Todd Dorman, Prosecutors:
Dump Offender Rule, QUAD-CITY TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006. (Prosecutors ask the court to do what the
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This article does not dispute the idea that sex offenders should be dealt with
harshly. But there has to be a time when enough is enough. The law should provide
some opportunity for repentance.8 Individuals make mistakes, but they should be
allowed an opportunity to change. Individuals like Lori Sue Collins, who after serving
three years for having sex with a teenage boy, found God. Upon her release, she worked
as the residence director at the Door of Hope, a halfway house for sex offenders.9 She
believed her calling was to help others like her turn away from the sins of their past and
live as productive members of society. But because the Door of Hope is located within
1,000 feet of a school bus stop, Lori had to quit her job and move because of residence
and employment restrictions.10
This article will look at why sex offenders are treated differently than other
criminal offenders. Sex offenders are subject to sanctions and prohibitions above and
beyond what other criminal offenders must face. Next, the article will look at some of
the residence and employment restrictions placed on sex offenders to determine if they
are rationally related to any legitimate government interest without overbearing the sex
offender’s constitutional rights. Finally, the article will offer an alternate means of sex
offense prevention that encourages sex offender assimilation back into society instead of
further exclusion.
This article will focus on those individuals who have been classified as sex
offenders and who have successfully completed their sentence, however long it may have
been. This article does not deal with laws aimed at restricting the freedom of individuals
released on probation or parole. Any type of supervised release is a contractual
agreement between the individual and the state and any rights an individual wishes to
waive to have some limited degree of freedom are within the individual's discretion and
the state's prerogative to require. There is no such bargain for those who have completed
their sentence. Society has an obligation to those who have paid their debt for the wrong
committed to accept a convict’s repentance.11 There should be at least some opportunity
for that individual to assimilate back into society. However, the residence and
employment laws currently promulgated by twenty-four states and many other local
communities around the country serve only to exile those who desire a second chance at

legislature cannot -- remove this law). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (standing for the
proposition that the political process should be balance and fair to everyone providing "one person, one
vote").
8
See e.g. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska, 1970) "The primary goal of such legislation is an attempt
to implement Alaska's constitutional mandate that penal administration shall be based on the principle of
reformation and upon the need for protecting the public"; ALA CODE §13A-1-3(5) The purpose of the
criminal code is "To insure the public safety by . . . the rehabilitation of those convicted." ALA CODE
§13A-1-3(6) "To prevent the arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of
offenses."
9
Whitaker et al., v. Purdue, et al., United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Complaint
filed June 20, 2006, pg 16-18.
<<http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/HB1059_Compla
int.pdf>>
10
Id.
11
Provided that the offender has served his/her time and actually seeks to turn away from his/her previous
deviant behavior.
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life.12 Instead of protecting society, these laws actually push individuals into antisocial
behavior and likely back into trouble with the law. But besides simply being bad public
policy, these laws are contrary to the ordered scheme of liberty that we hold so dear. As
Justice McKenna so eloquently put it almost 100 years ago:
His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but
he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever
kept under the shadow of his crime forever kept within voice and view of
the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicile without
giving notice to the "authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,"
and without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes
and among other people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope
is taken from him and he is subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so
tangible as iron bars and stonewalls, oppress as much by their continuity,
and deprive of essential liberty.13
I. Who is a sex offender?
A lawbreaker is a sex offender if he or she is guilty of one of the many
enumerated crimes that constitute a sex offense. The definition of what is a sex offense is
set forth by statute and varies from state to state. In some states the list is short, while in
others the list is extensive. The status of being a sex offender may not be limited to
individuals with felony convictions. Even a class A misdemeanor conviction can result
in being labeled a sex offender.14 For most states there is a three prong designation for
12

There 19 states with residence restrictions, not a condition of probation/parole/supervision, in order of
enactment or latest amendments. Delaware (July 25, 1995) (OD); Alabama (Sept. 1, 1999) (OD); Illinois
(July 7, 2000) (OD, SVP); Louisiana (June 28, 2001) (SVP); Iowa (July 1, 2002) (OD); Arkansas (July 16,
2003) (RD+SVP); Ohio (July 31, 2003) (OD); Oklahoma (Nov. 1, 2003) (RD); Tennessee (June 8, 2004)
(RD); Missouri (June 14, 2004) (OD); Florida (Oct. 1, 2004) (OD); Michigan (Jan. 1, 2006) (RD); Georgia
(July 1, 2006) (RD); Idaho (July 1, 2006) (RD); Indiana (July 1, 2006) (RD); Mississippi (July 1, 2006)
(RD); South Dakota (July 1, 2006) (RD); Virginia (July 1, 2006) (OD); Kentucky (July 12, 2006) (RD).
The term in parentheses indicates whether the classification is Offense Driven (OD), Registration Driven
(RD), or applies to Sexually Violent Predators (SVP). See infra Table 1 for citations. 8 states have a
residence restriction as a condition of probation/parole/supervision: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 411604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West 2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. §
947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 948.30(1)(b) (2006); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-34(g)(2)(B) (West 2006), IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2.2(2) (West 2006); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:538(D)(1)(c) (West 2006); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 62-12-26(b)(1) (2006).
13
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910)
14
For example, In Illinois, where the residence restrictions is offense driven, one of the offenses is
"indecent solicitation of an adult." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5). A person who arranges for a
person 17 years of age or over to commit an act of sexual conduct with a person 13 or older but under 17
commits a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/11-6.5. In Michigan, a second or subsequent
conviction for indecent exposure subjects you to the residence restriction. MICH COMP. LAWS
28.722(e)(iii). Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to 2 years, or a fine up
to $2,000, or both. MICH. COMP. LAWS 750.335a(2)(b). In Missouri, furnishing pornographic material to
minors subjects you to the residence restriction. MO. CODE. ANN. 566.147(1). Furnishing pornographic
material to minors is a Class A misdemeanor. MO. CODE ANN. 573.040(2). Indecent exposure subjects
you to the residence restriction in Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 582(A). Although the crime is
categorized as a felony, the punishment ranges from a fine of $500 to $20,000, imprisonment from 30 days
to 10 years, or both. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021(A). So, you could plead guilty, pay a $500 fine, and
be forced out of your home.
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sex offender registration which subjects them to the residence and employment
restrictions. A sex offender typically is a person convicted of a sexually violent offense,
deemed a sexually violent predator, or convicted of a criminal offense against a victim
who is a minor.15
The interesting aspect about this classification scheme as it relates to residence
and employment restrictions is that for two of the three categories it does not matter
whether the victim of the underlying crime is a child. So a person who is convicted of
sex abuse against another adult is prohibited from living or working where children
congregate as if he or she were a child molester. Focusing on the child victim is not clear
enough either. Some states limit the status of "sex offender" to "child sex offender" in
which case only crimes where the victim is a minor are considered.16 Crimes against
adults are not used in that particular classification.17 For this classification, it does not
matter if there is any sexual intent involved -- only that the victim of the crime is a child.
For these restrictions to be rationally related to the interests of protecting children from
sexual criminals, then the crimes which classify convicts as sex offenders should at a
minimum include a sexual act and a child.18
Many people may think of sex offenders as "dirty old men prowling the streets,"
but with the wide spectrum of offenses that automatically lead to being classified as a sex
offender, many times sex offenders are decent people who made a mistake.19 Take
Wendy Whitaker, for example. At 17, she had consensual sexual relations with a 15year-old boy.20 Now 26, and without any other mark on her criminal record, she is a sex
offender who is captured under Georgia's sex offender restrictions. Or Jay Hikes, who at
the age of 19 had consensual sex with a 15-year-old girl in New Jersey.21 Now 36,
married and with a small child, he too will be caught up in the broad net of sex offender
residence and employment restrictions. Silly mistakes and actions that many people other
15

See et al GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (effective July 1, 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1 (West 2006).
See e.g. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.3(c)(1), 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5) (A “child sex offender” is a person who,
Has been charged with a sex offense or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and (a) Is convicted,
(b)Is found not guilty by reason of insanity, or (c) Is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a
hearing; or (d) Is certified as a sexually dangerous person, when any conduct giving rise to such
certification is committed or attempted against a person less than 18 years of age.)
17
See e.g. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Sex offense means, 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5)
Child luring. Aiding and abetting child abduction. Indecent solicitation of a child. Indecent solicitation of
an adult. Soliciting for a juvenile prostitution. Keeping a place of juvenile prostitution. Patronizing a
juvenile prostitute. Juvenile pimping. Exploitation of a child. Child pornography. Predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child. Ritualized abuse of a child. Criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18 years
of age). Aggravated criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18 years of age). Aggravated criminal
sexual abuse (when victim under 18 years of age). Criminal sexual abuse (when victim under 18 years of
age). Kidnapping (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent). Aggravated kidnapping
(when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent). Unlawful restraint (when victim under 18
years of age and defendant not parent). Aggravated unlawful restraint (when victim under 18 years of age
and defendant not parent). An attempt to commit any of the aforementioned offenses.
18
See Raines v. State, 805 So.2d 999 (Fla. App. 4th. 2001) (holding that inclusion of defendant in
definition of "sexual offender," without concomitant sexual component, rendered sexual offender
registration statute overinclusive in violation of equal protection).
19
Jenny Jarvie. Suit Target's Georgia Sex Offender Law. L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2006.
20
Jenny Jarvie. Suit Target's Georgia Sex Offender Law. L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2006.
21
Doug Nurse. Many Feel Impact of New Sex Offender Law. ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, July 6,
2006.
16

4

would not have had qualms about doing could earn individual the sex offender label.22
So, it is not just those who commit rape, incest and sex abuse who are branded a sex
offender. There is a significant probability that individuals with little potential to reoffend are treated the same as those who actually are predators.23
In the handful of states where there are sex offender employment and residence
restrictions, sex offender status can be earned automatically with a conviction of a
particular crime. In Alabama, for example, a conviction, even a nolo contendere plea, of
the following will result in sex offender classification: Rape in the first or second degree;
sodomy in the first of second degree; sexual torture; sex abuse in the first or second
degree; enticing a child to enter a vehicle, room, house, office, or other place for immoral
purposes; promoting prostitution in the first or second degree; violation of the Alabama
Child Pornography Act; kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent, in the first or second
degree; incest, when the offender is an adult and the victim is a minor; soliciting a child
by computer for the purposes of committing a sexual act and transmitting obscene
material to a child by computer; any solicitation, attempt, or conspiracy to commit any of
the aforementioned offenses24 and a conviction for any criminal sex offense when the
victim was under the age of 12 and any offense involving child pornography.25
Sex offender status is painted with a broad brush, marking more individuals than
necessary. The label is one that should be avoided at all costs. As a result statutes that
require automatic inclusion by those convicted of particular crimes will likely make
convictions for those crimes more difficult to come by. As the time frame for potential
punishment is extended, many individuals accused of such crimes will not be willing to
accept a guilty plea regardless of the suggested punishment.26 The status of being a sex
offender is a long-term, even a lifetime, marking. Such a stigma should be very narrowly
applied, if at all.
II. Why all the fuss over this crime?
Sex offenders are a special cast of criminals that excite the general public more
than other run-of-the-mill criminals.27 The combination of sex and violence makes for a
22

A sex offender could just be a person who committed a mischievous act such as mooning or streaking.
See generally, Kaffie Sledge. Labels May Mislead, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, June 29, 2006. "For
instance, if reported, relieving oneself outdoors (behind a tree on the golf course or behind a building)
could result in being charged with a sex offense. It's a misdemeanor if the witness is an adult; a felony if
witnessed by a minor." Id.
23
Sometimes innocent fun can be criminal. KUTV, 8-Year-Old Charged For Sexual Conduct With Sitter,
July 28, 2005, Salt Lake City, Utah. (A 14-year-old female baby-sitter "dared" the 8-year-old boy, in a
game of truth-or-dare, to touch her breasts, which he did. When he told his mother about it, she called the
police and both the 8-year-old boy and the 14-year-old baby-sitter where charged with lewdness with a
minor. The charges were later dropped.) Available at
http://kutv.com/topstories/local_story_210004013.html
24
ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(4).
25
ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(5).
26
Even an offer of probated sentence might be rejected as a matter of course if the sex offender label must
attach. The less plea bargains the more trials. One might speculate that within a brief period of time the
bulk of the criminal cases tried will be sex offenses.
27
See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 829, 881-82 (2000) "Stories about crime involving children in particular tap
into a complex of concerns about modern life. Indeed, it is noteworthy that so many of the moral panics of
the nineties involved children in either a victim or an offender role (or in the case of drug use, both victim
and offender)." Id.
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story line that sells.28 Readers and viewers are titillated by these often NC-17 rated
stories. Throw a story line that includes children into the mix with sex and violence and
you have a potential to create a lynch mob. Stories of just a few abused children can
unite the public to demand change.29 Media attention can blow a situation out of

28

Popular television shows such as Law & Order: Special Victims Unit or Dateline NBC use sex stories to
capture and audience.
29
See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006).
SEC. 2. IN RECOGNITION OF JOHN AND REVÉ WALSH ON THE OCCASION OF THE
25TH ANNIVERSARY OF ADAM WALSH'S ABDUCTION AND MURDER.
(a) ADAM WALSH'S ABDUCTION AND MURDER.--On July 27, 1981, in Hollywood, Florida,
6-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted at a mall. Two weeks later, some of Adam's remains were
discovered in a canal more than 100 miles from his home.
SEC. 102. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.
In order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to
the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below, Congress in this Act
establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders:
(1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old, was abducted in 1989 in Minnesota, and remains
missing.
(2) Megan Nicole Kanka, who was 7 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in
1994, in New Jersey.
(3) Pam Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a career offender in Houston, Texas.
(4) Jetseta Gage, who was 10 years old, was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 2005,
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
(5) Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted and murdered in 2003, in North
Dakota.
(6) Jessica Lunsford, who was 9 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, buried alive, and
murdered in 2005, in Homosassa, Florida.
(7) Sarah Lunde, who was 13 years old, was strangled and murdered in 2005, in Ruskin, Florida.
(8) Amie Zyla, who was 8 years old, was sexually assaulted in 1996 by a juvenile offender in
Waukesha, Wisconsin, and has become an advocate for child victims and protection of children
from juvenile sex offenders.
(9) Christy Ann Fornoff, who was 13 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in
1984, in Tempe, Arizona.
(10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp, who was 30 years old, was brutally attacked and murdered in a
public restroom by a repeat sex offender in 2002, in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
(11) Polly Klaas, who was 12 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1993
by a career offender in California.
(12) Jimmy Ryce, who was 9 years old, was kidnapped and murdered in Florida on September 11,
1995.
(13) Carlie Brucia, who was 11 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in February,
2004.
(14) Amanda Brown, who was 7 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in 1998.
(15) Elizabeth Smart, who was 14 years old, was abducted in Salt Lake City, Utah in June 2002.
(16) Molly Bish, who was 16 years old, was abducted in 2000 while working as a lifeguard in
Warren, Massachusetts, where her remains were found 3 years later.
(17) Samantha Runnion, who was 5 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in
California on July 15, 2002.
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proportion so that it appears that isolated events are really an epidemic.30 The laws often
reflect the plight of the particular child who precipitated the law by carrying their names,
such as Kyle, Megan or Jessica.31
Crimes involving sex, especially when the victim is a child, are perceived as more
heinous crimes because the degree of violation of our personal privacy and innocence.
Victims of sex crimes rarely just walk away from the incident without some physical or
emotional scarring. In fact, nearly one-third of all rape victims, regardless of age, suffer
some sort of post-traumatic stress disorder.32
Anger is easily stirred against those who commit sex crimes. Sex offenders are
not even honored among thieves.33 It is not uncommon for prisoners to execute jailhouse
justice to those who commit sex crimes, especially if it involved a minor.34 Up until June
2006, in Illinois, the sex offender classification included those who murder children. A
child-murderer asked for and received a new separate classification because he did not
30

For example, anytime there is a shark attack news coverage of such an event gives people a false
perception that shark attacks are common.
<<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/01/0123_040123_tvgreatwhiteshark.html>>. When in
reality the likelihood of being attacked by a shark is extremely rare. From 1670-2001 there were only 2,110
reported shark attacks worldwide. <<http://www.sharkattackphotos.com/Images/Misc/attackmap.jpg>> ;
See also Sharp, CT (Letter to the Editor) C'mon, ST. LOUIS JOURNALISM REVIEW, Dec. 1, 2003, Vol. 34,
Issue 262 "In November, KSDK (Channel 5) promoted a story about sex offenders living near school bus
stops as if it had discovered a plague epidemic in St. Louis. I know that November is sweeps month, but
this promo was ridiculous. . . It has to be at the top of the list of sensationalistic non-stories fabricated by
Channel 5."
31
See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, Title XVII, § 170101 (Sept. 13, 1994). Key Developments in Jacob Wetterling
Disappearance, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE (August 2, 2006) (available at
http://www.startribune.com/462/story/592010.html); Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145 (May 17, 1996).
Named after Megan Nicole Kanka. Steinhamilton, L., Megan’s Law Interests Britain, NEWARK STAR
LEDGER (July 23, 2006) (available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news4/115362967774340.xml&coll=1); Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-236 (Oct. 3, 1996); Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent
Predators' Treatment and Care Act, Fla. HB 3327, ch. 98-64 (May 19, 1998). Hancock, D., Kidnappers Are
Seldom Strangers, CBS News (June 19, 2002) (available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/19/national/main512745.shtml); Jessica Lunsford Act, Fla. HB 1877, ch.
2005-28 (May 2, 2005). Fineout, G. & Klas, M., Dead Kids are Campaign Fodder for Crist, MIAMI
HERALD (Aug. 3, 2006) (available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm) Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006). Santiago, R. &
Demarzo, W., New Law Marks Adam Walsh Case Anniversary, MIAMI HERALD (July 27, 2006) (available
at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm).
32
NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME. Rape-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
<<http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentAction=ViewProperties&
DocumentID=32366&UrlToReturn=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncvc.org%2fncvc%2fmain.aspx%3fdbName%3
dAdvancedSearch>>
33
Sex offenders, especially child sex offenders, are treated poorly in prison. Among prisoners sex
offenders are considered the lowest prisoners of all. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No Escape: Male Rape in
U.S. Prisons. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report4.html#N_222_>>
34
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons.
<<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report4.html#N_222_>> Explaining the targeting of prisoners
convicted of sexually abusing minors, another inmate said: Inmates confined for sexual offenses, especially
those against juvenile victims, are at the bottom of the pecking order and consequentially most often
victimized. Because of their crime, the general population justifies using their weakness by labeling rape
"just punishment" for their crime. Sexual offenders are the number one target group for prisoner rape. Id.
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want to be labeled as a sex offender because of the stigma.35 When abusing a child is
considered worse than murdering a child, there is little doubt the term "sex offender"
brands a deep mark.
Finally, there is a dangerousness myth that surrounds sex offenders.36 Studies in
the 1970s and 1980s that suggested sex offender recidivism was not affected by treatment
led many to the conclusion that there was nothing that could be done to curb the deviant
behavior.37 Couple the misuse of research data with a media that sensationalizes sex
crimes and sex offenders, and it is no wonder the public sentiment against sex offenders
is so high.38
III. Comparative recidivism rates
Contrary to popular public opinion, the recidivism rate for sex crimes is no worse
than the recidivism rate for other crimes.39 In fact, sex offense recidivism is extremely
low compared to the recidivism for other crimes.40 According to the Department of
Justice’s statistics of sex offender recidivism, 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested
for a sex offense within three years of their release.41 Forty-three percent of convicted
sex offenders were arrested for all crimes during this same period, but the overwhelming
majority of those arrests were for other non-sexual allegations.42 Also, using arrests as
proof of behavior is misleading because those with a criminal record are often the first
ones blamed for new criminal activity.
While a 24 percent recidivism rate might sound high, using it as a call to arms
when most other crimes have a similar propensity or worse is fallacious. For example, 67
percent of drug convicts are rearrested within three years with a conviction rate of 47

35

Jocelyn Black, Illinois House and Senate Agree to Send ‘Sex Offender Only’ Bill, MEDILL NEWS
SERVICE, http://mesh.medill.northwestern.edu/mnschicago/archives/2006/04/sexoffdb_the_il.html (April 6,
2006). On June 27, 2006, the governor signed into law the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against
Youth Registration Act. The Act provides for the registration of persons who were previously registered as
sex offenders under the Sex Offender Registration Act for the offenses of kidnapping, aggravated
kidnapping, unlawful restraint, aggravated unlawful restraint, first degree murder, child abduction, and
forcible detention when those offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age. See HB
4193, Public Act 94-0945. State rep. John Fritchey (D-Chicago) introduced the bill in November 2005. He
said that he was inspired, by a woman, whose son would have to register as a sex offender, even though his
murder conviction didn't have anything to do with a sexual crime. "As a father, I know firsthand how
terrifying the words 'sex offender' are to a parent and I have zero tolerance for those individuals," Rep.
Fritchey said in a press release. "But we're essentially talking about truth in labeling here. We were
attaching a very powerful and inaccurate stigma to someone whose transgression did not warrant it. He was
essentially facing a second sentence for a crime he did not commit." Id.
36
See <<http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html>>
37
Id.
38
See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission's Obligation to
Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders. 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 569 (2002).
39
See Iowa Dep't of Human Rights Div. of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning and Statistical Analysis
Center. Iowa Sex Offender Registry and Recidivism (Dec. 2000); Bureau of Justice Statistics. Recidivism of
Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, NCJ 198281, at 14, (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. "The 43% re-arrest rate of the 9,691 released sex
offenders was low by comparison." Id.
40
See Bureau of Justice Statistics. Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, NCJ 198281,
(Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
41
Id. at 2.
42
Id. at 14.
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percent,43 yet there is no restriction keeping drug offenders from living or working near
schools. While most states have laws that enhance a drug crime if it takes place within a
certain distance from a school, there is nothing to prevent drug offenders from living
there after they are released.44 Thus, sex offender employment and residence restrictions
are either precursors of what is to come to all criminal offenders or a special sanction for
only the sex offender.
Data can be used to mislead. As often stated there are “lies, damn lies – and
statistics.”45 The data collected for sex offender recidivism could fit into all three
categories. The Department of Justice is guilty of misleading the public with noninformative information. In its introduction and highlights section the report lists that
"sex offenders are four times more likely to be arrested for of a new sex crime than nonsex offenders."46 Statistics make this true because only 1.3 percent of the non-sex
offenders committed sex crimes.47 Looking at the raw numbers, the actual incidences of
sexual recidivism is much greater for the non-sex offenders than the sex offenders.48 So,
with all the focus on the convicted sex offenders we miss approximately 86.5 percent of
the new sex crimes.49
IV. Restrictions
With the belief that proximity leads to promiscuity, twenty-four states currently
have some form of residence and/or employment restrictions for convicted sex offenders
with other states, such as California looking to join the fray.50 These restrictions may last
for only the designated period of supervised release or apply for the remainder of an
offender's life.51 Nineteen states have residence and/or employment restrictions that
apply beyond the period of any probation or parole period.52 In some states these
restrictions are permanent with no process or ability to remove the burden.53 These
restrictions have disastrous effects on convicted sex offenders who are trying to be decent
43

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 at 11, (2002) available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf.
44
See e g. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §6314 (b) (3-4). "In addition to the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in
subsection (a), the person shall be sentenced to an additional minimum sentence of at least two years total
confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary, if the person
did any of the following: . . . 3) Committed the offense within 1,000 feet of the real property on which is
located a public, private or parochial school or a college or university. (4) Committed the offense on a
school bus or within 500 feet of a school bus stop." I.d.
45
A quote from Mark Twain’s Autobiography (1924). Twain gives credit for the quote to Disraeli. See <<
http://www1c.btwebworld.com/quote-unquote/p0000149.htm>>.
46
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released From Prison in 1994, NCJ 198281, at
1, (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/rsorp94.htm.
47
Id.5.3 percent is four times more than 1.3 percent, but neither is very high.
48
Id. 517 of 9,691 sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years compared to 3,328
out of 262,420 non-sex offenders. Id.
49
Id. Of the 3845 new sex crime arrests, 3,328 were from non-sex offenders. Id.
50
See footnote 11; See also California Ballot Initiative Proposition 83 on the fall 2006 ballot.
51
See e.g. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1). (setting the restrictive period at 10 years) see also ALA. CODE § 15-2033(a) (setting the restrictive period at life).
52

See infra note 11.
For example, Iowa has no means for a sex offender subject to residence and employment restrictions to
ever have those restrictions lifted. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that "there is
no requirement that the State provide a process to establish an exemption from a legislative classification.")
citing Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003).
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members of the community. Often they are forced to quit their jobs and move.54 By
having these restrictions a state's public policy demonstrates a preference for sex
offenders to be unemployed and living in an "RV in old K-Mart parking lot" or in a
"truck near the river" or "under the 7th street bridge."55 With these laws, sex offenders
are forced to live nomadic lives.
It is not uncommon to have laws that prevent activities from taking place within a
certain distance of a school, church or residential area.56 What is unique about these
restrictions is the lack of any criminal desire required. These zoning restrictions do not
involve a crime, as in the case with selling or possessing drugs or guns near schools.57 In
this case, the mere physical presence of a former sex offender is the offense. The thrust
of the injustice in these laws is against those who have completed their sentence and are
not released as parolees or probationers. It is these individuals who are ready to start
their lives over; but with these residence and employment restrictions hanging over their
heads, they will have a difficult time assimilating.
Residence
Nineteen states58 and many other local communities have enacted residence
restrictions on former sex offenders, prohibiting them from living a certain distance away
from schools,59 child-care facilities,60 public swimming pools,61 public playgrounds,62
churches or any area where minors congregate, such as parks, arcades and even school
bus stops.63 Restrictions from living 500, 1,000, 1,500 or 2,000 feet from the above
mentioned areas seems like a quick and simple fix to the perceived recidivism problem.
However, this final solution actually solves nothing while presenting a host of new
problems, the least of which is a violation of the individual's constitutional rights.
The residence restrictions are typically from property line to property line and not
door-to-door, so the prohibited area is often larger than one might expect.64 Communities
that have restrictions of 2,000 feet essentially block out all of the urban areas as the
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Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From
Danger or One Step From Absurd? 49 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND
COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 168 (2005).
55
These are actual responses by individuals forced to move and list their new address with their sex
offender treatment providers in Iowa. See
<<http://www.dc.state.ks.us/SOHR/Twenty_Findings_on_Restrictions_for_Sex_Offenders.htm>>
56
See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115(1)(Exhibiting a firearm or weapon within a 1,000 feet of a school);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115(2)(b)(Possessing an electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other
weapon on school property); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115(2)(c)(Possessing firearm on school property).
57
See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-5 (Death by vehicular manslaughter is worse if the perpetrator was
intoxicated and the victim was on school grounds)
58
See infra table 1.
59
See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a).
60
Id.
61
See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (West 2006) (effective June 28, 2001).
62
See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(1) (West 2006) (effective July 12, 2006).
63
See e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2). See also infra table 1.
64
See e.g. In Georgia, the distance is measured from the property boundary of the sex offender’s residence
to the property boundary of the child care facility, school, or area where minors congregate, at their closest
points. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13(b). But in Kentucky, the measurement shall be taken in a straight line from
the nearest wall of the school to the nearest wall of the registrant’s place of residence. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17.495.
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overlapping bubbles leave few if any reasonable places to reside.65 A quick look at an
urban area map will demonstrate how such restrictions severely limit housing options for
sex offenders.66 The purpose it seems is to drive sex offenders out of the community.
Some legislators are even so brazen as to admit such intent.67 Whether banishment is the
purpose, it is the result.
Among the states that have residence restrictions, there is some discrepancy in
determining which sex offenders qualify for residence restrictions. In Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Tennessee, the residence
restrictions are registration driven. In other words, all individuals who have to register as
sex offenders are subject to residence restrictions.68 In Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri,
and Ohio, the residence restrictions are offense driven, so the application is not as facially
broad, but is still significant.69 In Louisiana, the residence restrictions apply only to those
classified as sexually violent predators. Arizona, California, Florida, Oregon, and Texas
only have residence restrictions as part of probation or parole or some other form of
supervised release.70 Indiana has enacted a more broadly applicable restriction, but the
previous law regarding parolees remains in effect.71
Washington and Nebraska are unique in that there is no overarching state mandate
for residence and employment restrictions with the actually decision on restrictions left
up to the local communities. The state does provide some guidance and limitations as to
how far the communities can go. Washington imposed a residence restriction on sex
offenders as a condition of community custody.72 The offender could not reside within
880 feet from the facilities or grounds of a public or private school.73 In 2006,
Washington established a committee to develop statewide standards for cities and towns
to use when determining whether to impose residency restrictions on sex offenders.74
Nebraska defers to and provides guidance for local communities that enact residency
restrictions. State legislation signed into law on April 13, 2006, allows cities to prohibit a
65

By reasonable I mean an affordable, safe living space. It is not reasonable to say that an individual has a
theoretical option to move to a certain neighborhood when the cost of living space far outlays the
individual’s financial means. Likewise, it is not reasonable to force people to move into a “high crime
area.”
66
See app. 1
67
See e.g. Whitaker et al., v. Purdue, et al., United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia,
Complaint filed June 20, 2006.
68
In Arkansas, being subject to registration is just the first part of the analysis. A registrant will also have
to declared dangerous with a score of three or four on a four point scale. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a)
(Michie 2006) (effective July 16, 2003).
69

It would be possible for some a person to be classified as a sex offender for registration purposes but not
subject to residence or employment restrictions -- like in Arkansas and Louisiana. While this is a variation
in classification it can have the same effect if all the enumerated offenses that subject one to registration are
also the same that apply to the residence and employment restrictions -- like in Alabama where all those
that have to register are subject to the residence requirements. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (2006)

(effective Sept. 1, 1999).
70

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006), CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West 2006),
FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006), OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006), TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006).
71
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006),
72
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.712(6)(a)(ii) (2006).
73
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(8). This provision expired July 1, 2006.
74
See 2006 Wash. Senate Bill 6325.
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high-risk sex offender whose victim was 18 years of age or younger from living within
500 feet of a school or child care facility.75
States that do not have a formal statewide restriction may have local ordinances
that from town to town vary in degree.76 Logistically, communities, if left to their own
devices, often take harsher stances against sex offenders to ensure that there is little or no
available housing since the effect of not having such prohibitions will be felt in a smaller
community. In such cases where only local ordinances exist, notice can be a problem.77
Employment
Along with residence restrictions, several states and local communities have also
enacted employment restrictions intended to keep sex offenders away from schools,
daycare facilities, playgrounds, public swimming pools, video arcades, recreation centers
or public athletic fields and the like.78 Similar to the residence restrictions, this is
employment zoning. Not only are sex offenders prohibited from working at these
locations, but they are also prohibited from working near these locations.79 Because most
sex offenses against children are committed by individuals who have a prior relationship
with their victims, there is a rational basis for keeping child offenders out of those
relationship-building type jobs such as a teacher or counselor at a school.80 But when the
law places a barrier around schools and playgrounds that block off large sections of the
community, the impact of this restriction for employment purposes is enormous and
unnecessary.
Jobs that require workers to work at new locations on a regular basis such as
plumbers, electricians, and construction are now off-limits to convicted sex offenders
because of the risk of inadvertently entering the restricted zones. Downtown areas will
be off-limits to prior offenders who are attorneys, accountants or other white-collar jobs.
With just one daycare facility located on one floor of a high-rise building, an entire city
block could be off-limits. For all practical purposes, sex offenders will be relegated to
agricultural work on the outskirts of the community. If that is not feasible, then
unemployment is the natural consequence of these restrictions.
As a matter of public policy, it is strange to prefer idleness over work. While
unemployment is not the stated objective of these restrictions, it is often the result. Being
productive is a key component to successful rehabilitation and in preventing recidivism.81
Employment plays a significant role in an individual's feeling of self-worth. Taking
away a person's ability to work attacks that person's dignity. With no documented proof
75
See Sexual Predator Residency Restriction Act, LB 1199, Sections 27 through 29. [I have more on this,
including comments from the bill sponsor, in the master document].
76
See e.g. Pamela A. MacLean, Suit Tests Power of Sex Offender Bans, Six Cities Want to Copy Law; They
Wait For Result, 28 NAT'L L. J. 6, (col. 2) Oct. 3, 2005, News Seattle; Associated Press, Cuero Wants to
Require Sex Offenders to Post Yard Signs, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM Jan. 6, 2006, News, State.
77
WOI-TV, Sex Offender's Wife Worries About Family Future, Nov. 23, 2005, "The Story County attorney
says his county first started drawing up maps about a month ago. Since then, they've changed it about
twenty times. As of Monday, their map still isn't finalized. That leaves sex offenders who know they need
to move, not knowing where they can go." Available at http://www.woitv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4056859&nav=1LFX .
78
See table 3.
79
See table 3.
80
Center for Sex Offender Management, Myths and Facts About Sex Offenders, pg.1, Aug. 2000.
81
Center For Sex Offender Management, Time to Work: Managing the Employment of Sex Offenders
Under Community Supervision, pg.1, Jan. 2002.
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that working in proximity to children increases sex crimes, it is odd that courts have done
nothing to stop governments from interfering with the essential right to earn a living.
Unencumbered without a home or a job, a convicted sex offender is more at risk to reoffend. After all, what else has he got to do?
Not Banishment?
The impetus for these not-in-my-backyard ordinances and laws is the perceived
need to keep children away from sex offenders. After all, would any person, if given the
choice, want a sex offender living next door? Once one community sets up such a law
driving the sex offenders out of its community, it forces the neighboring community to
act in kind to avoid becoming a haven for sex offenders.82 When a community or state
adopts a 1,000-foot rule or greater, that community is effectively removing that
individual from its community by its strategic zoning. By looking at a map with the
1,000-foot radius placed in for every school, there is very little room for sex offenders to
live.83 When daycare facilities, including residential homes that serve as a day care
facility are added in, the possible living area is even smaller. For states like Georgia, that
also add in places where children might congregate, all school bus stops and churches,
then the map is completely covered.84
Banishment, not protection, is the desired goal of these laws.85 Georgia House
Majority leader Jerry Keen, the chief sponsor of 2006 Georgia House Bill 1059, stated,
"We want those people running away from Georgia. Given the toughest laws here, we
think a lot of people could move to another state. If it becomes too onerous and too
inconvenient, they just may want to live somewhere else. And I don't care where, as long
as it's not Georgia."86 The effect of this law in Georgia would be to send sex offenders
scrambling to find housing and employment, regardless of how long they have lived in
their current residence. That is the intent. Rep. Keen echoed his sentiments in the house
chambers when he said, “If someone did something now to my grandchildren, I think you
and I would have the same reaction to that. Those are the people we’re targeting. Those
are the people we are trying to get off the streets of this state, and those are the people
that we are going to send a message to that if you have a propensity to that crime perhaps
you need to move to another state.”87 If the law stands, Rep. Keen would get his wish. In
Forsyth County, Georgia, 64 of 68 registered sex offenders would have to move -- most
likely out of the county.88 But the situation is even worse in neighboring counties. For
instance, in DeKalb County, Georgia, a suburb of Atlanta, 466 of the 466 registered sex

82

See Mike Carlson, Not In My City, ORLANDO WEEKLY, Aug. 25, 2005.
See app. 1.
84
Act No. 571, Ga. Laws 2006 (HB 1059) codified at Ga. Code Ann § 42-1-15 (2006).
85
Jason Garcia, Legislator seeks statewide limiting where sex offenders can live, SOUTH FLORIDA SUNSENTINEL, Sept. 15, 2005 (quoting Rep. Susan Goldstein who introduced a bill in the Florida legislature to
increase the residence restrictions from 1000 feet to 2500, the ultimate goal is to "get these people out of
our neighborhoods and hopefully out of our state.") Id.
86
Quote taken from Complaint filed in United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
June 20, 2006, Wendy Whitaker, et al. v. Sonny Perdue, et al. pg. 24 paragraph 56.
87
See Statement by Representative Keen to Representative Roger Bruce during House debate on HB 1059,
Feb. 2, 2006, House Internet Broadcasts,
<http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2086,4802_6107103_47120020,00.html.>
88
Doug Nurse, How Push May Lead to a Shove. ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, July 6, 2006,
<http://www.ajc.com/search/content/auto/epaper/editions/today/northside_44ca1799913b127500d2.html>
83
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offenders would have to move.89 Pushed out of the urban areas, those affected are forced
into the country or out of the state.
The real impetus of these bills is not on protecting children, but punishing former
sex offenders once again.90 In response to criticism of the residence restrictions in
Kentucky, Kenton County Sheriff Chuck Korzenborn stated, "I don't care how
inconvenient we make it for these guys. . . . Don't commit the crime and you won't have
to do the time."91 These zoning laws are so onerous to comply with that it is just a matter
of time before innocent people are locked up. Take the situation in the New Jersey
townships of Jackson and Lakewood, where four months after adopting sex offender
residency ordinances they still had not produced maps showing the “pedophile-free
zones.”92 “There will be a map generated, not so someone can say, ‘Oh, that’s not where I
can live,’” said a Jackson police captain. “It’s not a question of them knowing, but so we
can know. If we want to charge them with the ordinance, we need the map.”93
If the real purpose was protection, then states that have adopted these programs
would offer proof that this community purging actually does protect the community and
its children. In fact, the states that have actually given thoughtful consideration to this
proposal before voting on it have found that there is no correlation between residency and
employment locale and recidivism. Colorado and Minnesota both did extensive research
on the issue and found that if anything, this forced exile only exacerbates the problem it
purports to solve.94
This forced migration of a select group of former criminals is unprecedented.
There were forced migrations of Indian Tribes in the 1830s95 and of Japanese-Americans
in the 1940s.96 There have been times when suspect groups of people, such as foreign
agents, Communists, and aliens were subject to monitoring and regulation.97 It is unique
89

Doug Nurse, How Push May Lead to a Shove. ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, July 6, 2006,
<http://www.ajc.com/search/content/auto/epaper/editions/today/northside_44ca1799913b127500d2.html>
Other metro Atlanta counties would have similar totals: In Cherokee County 90 of 95; Clayton County 190
of 220; Cobb County 204 of 208; Henry County 100 of 108; and Rockdale 29 of 29. Id.
90
Joyce Blay, Police Waiting for Maps to Enforce Residency Law, TRI-TOWN NEWS, Sept. 22, 2005.
91
William Croyle, Sex Offenders Put on Notice CINCINNATI ENQUIRER August 14, 2006.
92
Id.
93
Id. (emphasis added).
94
See Colorado Dep't of Public Safety, Report on Safety Issues Raised By Living Arrangements For and
Locations of Sex Offenders in the Community, (prepared for the Colorado State Judiciary Committees,
Senate and House of Representatives) 2004, (finding no correlation between where sex offenders lived in
comparison to where other criminals lived therefore, a residence restriction would not be a productive
method to control recidivism) available at
http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/Sex_Offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01.pdf ; Minnesota Dep't of
Corrections, Level Three Sex Offenders Residential Placement Issues, (Report to the Legislature) 2003.
(finding that the residence restrictions would force the state to provide housing for those displaced by such
an act and that the cost of creating new housing would be too high along with a belief that residential
restrictions would not enhance community safety) available at
http://www/corr.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports/pdf/2004/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS
%20report%202003%20(revised%202-04).pdf
95
Pursuant to the Indian Removal Act see http://ngeorgia.com/history/nghisttt.html.
96
Act of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat.173, 18 USCA 97a. See also Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
97
Michele L. Earl-Hubbard. The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Depravation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s.90 NW. U. L
REV. 788, 815 fn.183. (1996).
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for a law to force one class of individuals away from the general population as if they
were contagious.98 It is outrageous for any court to mischaracterize laws that require
citizens living in a law-abiding manner to quit their jobs and uproot their families, taking
them out of their chosen communities and forcing them into underdeveloped areas by not
calling it what it is -- banishment.
V. Penalties For Being In the Zone
Violations of the residence or employment restrictions are much more than just a
slap on the wrist. For most states the first violation is a felony.99 In Alabama and
Georgia, it is a severe felony with up to 30 years for one violation.100 In many cases a
violation of this prohibition is punished with greater severity than the crime that made the
person a sexual offender to begin with.
Interestingly, for the most part there is no mens rea required to violate these
restrictions. A sexual offender may be strictly liable for complying with these
prohibitions.101 The basic problem with this is the fact that the prohibited areas are
growing constantly. An individual may live or work outside a protected zone only to
have a daycare facility pop up near the sex offender. In such a case, the sex offender
would have little recourse and no knowledge of such an event.
What is really going on is that these regulations are a way to punish sex offenders
twice for one criminal act. Feeling unsatisfied and impotent, states and local
communities set legal traps for the convicted sex offenders to fall into so that they can
incarcerate them again. It is just a matter of time before a sex offender who tries to
remain in a community will violate these specially crafted restrictions.
VI. Unintended Consequences
There are unintended consequences of the residence and employment restrictions
that may actually exacerbate the problem that the laws were intended to correct. Because
these laws are often passed without much consideration as to the results of
implementation, there have been many negatives consequences. The shortsightedness of
these laws is that in their zeal to protect they give the sex offender little hope of
redemption. “We express a desire for rehabilitation of the individual, while
simultaneously we do everything to prevent it. . . . We tell him to return to the norm of
behavior, yet we brand him as virtually unemployable; he is required to live with his
normal activities severely restricted and we react with sickened wonder and disgust when
he returns to a life of crime.”102 Coupled with the fact that these restrictions will not
work and the negatives far exceed the positives. That is why the Iowa County Attorney's
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In an effort to curb prostitution, Richmond, Virginia, city officials want to make parts of the city off
limits to particular individuals unless they lived, worked or worshipped in the area. Jim Nolan, Zones
Would Bar Prostitutes, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH Sept.11, 2006.
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Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Tennessee. See infra table 2.
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See infra table 2.
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Offenders are strictly liable in Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and South Dakota.
See infra table 2.
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Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 953 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting) As cited by
Michael Duster, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711
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Association has publicly called for the overturning of Iowa's 2,000 foot residence
restriction.103
By pushing sex offenders away from society, these laws can isolate sex offenders
from their friends, co-workers and other support systems. Without support, the sex
offender is left to fend off any deviant urges on his or her own. Without employment and
residence displacement, a sex offender will face idle time, which is a factor in favor of
recidivism.104 Social science research indicates that "during the past 20 years, research on
recidivism of the general criminal population identified a history of unstable employment
as one of the factors that consistently is associated with criminal behavior."105 As
Kathleen Colebank, a supervisor for Kentucky's sex offender treatment program states,
"With many of the people we treat, isolation played a role in them committing the offense
and we risk replicating that."106
In areas where residence restrictions exist, there are limited choices for housing
for those classified as sex offenders. As a result, the likelihood exists that sex offenders
will be concentrated in certain areas of town or certain areas just outside of town, if they
can find any reasonable housing at all.107 The market value of a neighborhood full of
registered sex offenders would most likely be depressed much like an area of town
deemed to be a "high crime area." Communities would then react against any
concentration of sex offenders. For example, the small town of Ely, Iowa, a town
without a single school or daycare center, passed local ordinances banning sex offenders
from living near the city park, playground or library, which effectively eliminated all
residential areas in the town.108 “We felt a little vulnerable,” said an Ely resident. “For a
lot of towns like ours, we can become the only place available for sex offenders.”109 Fear
then is the driving force.
Residence restrictions leave many offenders homeless. The coverage area is so
large, especially in 2,000-feet areas, that there is limited housing available. In states or
communities where multiple difficult-to-identify triggers exist, such as daycare facilities,
school bus stops or places where children congregate, even a smaller prohibited area
severely limits reasonable housing. Much of the permissible property is located in highrent districts or in more rural areas where housing is limited.
The homeless problem creates an enforcement problem. Although offenders are
required to provide a valid address when they register, it is not uncommon for an offender
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to have to move to comply with the residence law. Subsequent reporting is poor.110 In
Iowa, for example, the number of missing sex offenders has more than doubled since the
residence restrictions went into effect in September 2005.111 Keeping up with the
migration of sex offenders will be a full-time job for law enforcement.112 Most do not
have the money or the manpower to devote so much time to herding people out of town.
Other states are losing track of their registered sex offenders, as well. Sex offenders
simply do not bother to register anymore because it will only lead to an immediate arrest.
In North Carolina, sex offenders are now missing in record numbers.113
Another unintended consequence would be the desire to create illegitimate
sanctuaries. Local communities would actively increase the number of protected areas by
increasing the number of public parks or lowering standards for residential daycare
facilities. In some states, it is fairly easy to have one’s home considered a child-care
facility, which would entitle it to the protection zone. In Iowa, for instance, as the
number of day care facilities increases it becomes more and more difficult to what
locations are off-limits.114 While there is nothing inherently wrong with having a surplus
of daycare facilities, the classification of many would be disingenuous. Similarly in
states that include school bus stops as a prohibited area, there would be impetus for
communities to artificially designate areas to zone off more of the community.115
Another enforcement problem is created by treating all sex offenders the same
regardless of the nature of their offense. By treating all sex offenders the same, the
number of individuals classified as a sex offender becomes too large to effectively
manage. The number of sex offenders will grow at a pace much faster than the
authorities can handle. Special units will need to be created that focus on the monitoring
of sex offenders. State and local governments, already strapped for funds, are not
equipped to handle all the work required by these restrictive ordinances.
These restrictions displace not only individuals, but also their families.116 The
impact of relocating is not just felt by the offender because the whole family unit must
move. A family may have to find new friends, attend new schools and find new places to
worship. Some families are faced with a difficult decision because of the reduction in the
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quality of life in staying together some may choose to remain without the offending
family member.
Finally, by establishing these residence and employment restrictions a community
is merely passing its perceived problem on to the next town. One by one, communities
are adopting laws -- not to handle a perceived current problem with local sex offenders -but as a defense mechanism to prevent displaced offenders from other areas from settling
in their community. In Orange Beach Alabama, residents not satisfied with the
Alabama's 2000 foot restriction passed an ordinance that increases the prohibited zones to
four miles.117 As community after community forbids offenders from residing in their
midst, sex offenders are left to wander the earth in search of acceptance.
VII. Constitutionality of These Restrictions
With the U.S. Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Doe v. Miller, the Court
currently tacitly permits residence and employment restrictions.118 The key aspect in
determining the constitutionality of these restrictions lies in whether the Court views
these restrictions as civil or criminal. The Court in Smith v. Doe upheld the sex offender
registrations as civil and regulatory because they did not prohibit the sex offender from
doing anything, it merely required them to do something that is not uncommon.119 Under
the Alaska statutory scheme, sex offenders just had to register themselves, much like any
other person would a motor vehicle. If a vehicle is moved from one jurisdiction to
another, the owner is required to update that registration. Having to register as a sex
offender does not prevent a sex offender from moving.120 Surprisingly, most courts that
have had opportunity to weigh in on this issue have upheld residence and employment
restrictions as constitutionality.121 The U.S. Supreme Court has not fully examined the
constitutionality of residence and employment restrictions but does suggest that there are
limits to the restrictions placed on sex offenders who have served their time.122
A. Ex Post Facto Laws
In general, ex post facto laws are laws passed after a particular event has occurred
to make the previous activity illegal.123 A prohibition against ex post facto laws is found
in the United States Constitution124 and serves as a foundational principle for our ordered
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scheme of liberty.125 The United States Constitution also prohibits states from enacting
such laws.126 Ex post facto laws are often considered void.127
In its first Ex Post Facto Clause case, the Supreme Court described four ways a
legislature could run afoul of it.128 Justice Chase wrote:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws,
are manifestly unjust and oppressive.129
"[B]ut the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to secure the person of
the subject from injury, or punishment, in consequence of such law."130
For a law to be ex post facto, it must also “disadvantage the offender affected by
it.”131 There is no requirement that it hinder any particular right. In fact, “[i]t need not
impair a ‘vested right.’ Even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the
grace of the legislature, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it is both retrospective and
more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.”132 For example, a change
in state law that altered how "good time credit" was calculated for inmates was an ex post
facto violation even though there is no constitutional right to "good time credit."133
Determining if a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause hinges on the purpose
of the law. If the legislature meant to impose punishment, then the statute violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause if it punishes previous activity.134 If the intention was to establish "civil
proceedings" by enacting a regulatory scheme that is civil and non-punitive, then the
court must look at the effect of the law.135
The first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislative intent. Courts give the
legislature the benefit of the doubt in determining intent, especially if there is an
explicitly stated intent within the statute.136 A high standard of proof is required to
overcome even a superficial statement of intent. The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in
Smith, "only the clearest proof will suffice to override that intent and transform what has
been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."137 Various courts have taken
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great pains to find a civil intent. For instance, the placement and naming of an act is
given more weight if it claims to be civil and is found in the civil code.138 The lack of
any identification or its placement in the criminal code is often treated as having little
probative value.139 Regardless of the label or placement of a restriction, the inquiry does
not end at this point.
In examining the legislative intent, it is important to see the lengths the legislature
went in analyzing the alleged problem. The courts must be sensitive to the fact that there
may not be legitimate debate and discussion on sex offender restrictions because of the
lack of real representation by the effected class: convicted sex offenders.140 The few
states that have taken the time to see if residence or employment restrictions would
actually work did not enact such provisions.141 Most legislative bodies act in haste with
one goal in mind: removing sex offenders from the community.142 The Supreme Court
has said that the “failure to consider, or to use, alternative and less harsh methods to
achieve a non-punitive objective can help to show that legislature’s ‘purpose was to
punish.’ ”143
Next a court must look at the practical effects of the restrictions and decide if
these restrictions are regulatory or punitive.144 A hardship placed on an individual is not
enough to make a restriction punitive. For instance, just because a restriction might cause
the community to distrust a sex offender, it will not be punitive unless it encourages an
act of retribution against the sex offender.145 As a result, sex offender registrations are not
considered punitive,146nor is civil commitment for sexually violent predators.147
The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez set forth seven factors to assist in
determining if a statute's restrictions constitute actual punishment.148 These factors are
not exhaustive but are helpful. The court will balance the factors, which at times,
contradict each other. They include: whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint; whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment: retribution and deterrence; whether the behavior to which
it applies is already a crime; whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it; and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.149
The civil/criminal analysis under Mendoza-Martinez tends to be result oriented.
Because there is no true test or measuring stick to distinguish the two, courts seem to
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weigh the factors according to the preferred outcome. How else could the court construe
confinement for those considered dangerous to be civil and not criminal, preventive and
not punitive, when the result of the restraints are exactly the same?150 As residence and
employment restrictions proliferate the landscape, court should eventually reach the point
at which these restrictions are considered punishment and not regulation.151
There are several important factual distinctions that distinguish residence and
employment restrictions from the two previous sanctions which were deemed regulatory:
sex offender registration and civil commitment. Residence and employment restrictions
place an affirmative burden on several fundamental liberty interests -- where to live,
work, raise a family and even travel. The freedom to live a law-abiding life in the
manner of one's own choosing should not be terminated by a criminal conviction. More
importantly, it should not be a result of conviction. Unlike registration requirements,
these restrictions are a new and unexpected restraint on sex offenders’ lives.152 The
ramifications of not being able to live and work where you choose is not a product of the
crime; it is a product of the legislation.
Residence and employment restrictions are not like registration requirements
because residence and employment restrictions actually impose a physical restraint on the
sex offender. The court in Smith v. Doe found that Alaska's registration law was not
punitive because "the Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the
punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability of
restraint."153 The court even goes on to say that "the Act does not restrain activities sex
offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences."154 Thus, the
Smith Court implies that a residence or employment restriction might be improper.
The Smith Court does note that particular employment prohibitions can be
legitimate civil sanctions. For example, the court has authorized the forbidding
participation in the banking industry,155 working as a union official156 or revocation of a
medical license.157 But these restrictions are case specific and are related to the
underlying deviant behavior that resulted in such a sanction. Restrictions that prohibit
working within a certain distance of a school or church have no particular correlation to
the previous employment of the sex offender or the relationship, if any, of the
employment to the criminal offense.
These restrictions are an inverted detention. In prison, offenders are confined to a
small space while society continues around it. Under these residence and employment
schemes, the walls are built around society and the offender is forced to live confined
150
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outside them.158 Essentially towns become gated communities with severe punishments
for trespassers. The issue boils down to the greater of two motives. Do these invisible
walls protect society or punish the offender, or both? If the objective is to incapacitate
the sex offenders so that they cannot re-offend, then that is a form of punishment.159
Unlike civil commitment, which provides some effort at rehabilitation through
counseling and psychological treatment, residence and employment restrictions have no
benefit to the sex offender.160 These restrictions are for the protection of the public by
removing these “dangerous” individuals. There is no evidence that these restrictions will
cure a sex offender of his or her deviant actions. In his dissent in Hendricks, Justice
Breyer states, “The Allen Court's focus upon treatment, as a kind of touchstone helping to
distinguish civil from punitive purposes, is not surprising, for one would expect a nonpunitive statutory scheme to confine, not simply in order to protect, but also in order to
cure.”161 There needs to be some benefit to all interested parties: the state and the
convicted offender. Protecting society alone is not enough. Especially since there is no
proof that these restrictions will even protect society.
Most of the residence and employment zoning restrictions apply only to a special
class of individuals: those who have previously committed a sexual offense.162 The civil
commitment contemplated in Hendricks involved offenders who had also been adjudged
to be dangerous. The Supreme Court has found that "an imposition of restrictive
measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a legitimate non-punitive
governmental objective."163 What is often missing from sex offender residence and
employment restrictions is a finding of dangerousness with the individual offenders. The
legislative trend is for residence restrictions to apply to all who are required to register
with no finding of dangerousness.164 For example, Arkansas and Louisiana apply these
restrictions only on those found to be sexually violent predators.165 This overbroad
classification does not take into account the life situation of its victims and creates
158
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unjustified havoc. For example, an 80-year-old Lexington, Kentucky, resident living in a
nursing home, where he is treated for dementia and heart ailments, will have to move to
the nearest nursing home facility that satisfies Kentucky's new harsher residence
restrictions -- two hours away.166 These restrictions treat all sex offenders the same
regardless if the offense was a misdemeanor or felony, a first or subsequent offense, a
predatory act or temporary lapse in judgment. The desire of these restrictions is to keep
the handful of truly deviant predators away from children, but its application is
overbearing and punitive on the vast majority of sex offenders.
Finally, violation of a true regulatory scheme results in a fine or injunction but
certainly does not carry a possible thirty-year prison term. Thirty years is a significant
criminal sanction available for only the most heinous crimes. With these laws in effect,
those classified as sex offenders live their lives in fear that they may inadvertently, and
with no malicious intent, violate this law and basically throw away the rest of their lives.
These restrictions are significant restraints equal to and perhaps even greater than the
punishment received for the underlying offense. There is a severe impact on those who
have served their time but languish under the status of being a sex offender. Individuals
who have paid their debt are now required to pay more. Subsequent punishments are
clear violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
B. Other Constitutional Claims
There is no more fundamental American right than the right to own property and
earn a livelihood.167 That right is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
which require due process before these interests can be taken away. The tension is
between a state's alleged exercise of its police power in the interest of the general welfare
and the process by which individuals lose their individual liberty. A state’s police power
does not give it unlimited power over individual liberty. As Justice Harlan stated, "the
police power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation"168
When a state is exercising its police power there must be a balance between the public
and private interests involved in order for the regulations to be reasonable.169
Sex offender residence and employment restrictions may violate other
constitutional provisions, but analysis of those claims is typically hindered by the
predicate determination that the restrictions are civil in nature. For instance, if a court
finds the proceedings and actions civil in nature, then the Fifth Amendment against selfincrimination right does not attach.170 Similarly, if the court refuses to call sanctions
punishment, then the constitutional scrutiny is greatly diminished.171
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A finding that a law is civil in nature effectively thwarts most constitutional
claims. Likewise, a determination that the restrictions are actually punishment will result
in multiple constitutional violations. Regardless of the number of constitutional
deficiencies, a court need only find one constitutional violation to make an act
unconstitutional.
Other constitutional claims are available, but will not be discussed in this article.
They include the following: Violation of substantive due process under the 14th
Amendment by restricting the right to own a home in location of one's own choosing,172
by violating the right to work173 and the right to travel;174 Violation of Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment by treating sex offenders different than all other
citizens;175 Violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 8th
Amendment;176 Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause;177 Violation of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.178
VIII. The Court Does Have its Breaking Point
Even though most of the previous case law has sanctified sex offender residence
and employment restrictions, there does seem to be a point where the U.S. Supreme
Court will say enough is enough. In his dissent in Hendricks, Justice Kennedy warns that
activities such as civil commitment for sex offenders would cross the line if “[it] were to
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental
abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil
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commitment is justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it.”179 Perhaps it
will start with a willingness to take down a statute that is imprecise in its understanding
and application, such as in Georgia. In July 2006, the addition of school bus stops to the
list of places a sex offender cannot live or work within 1,000 feet was deemed too
imprecise because there was no formal declaration of a school bus stop.180 Or perhaps
the Court will conclude that the classification of sex offenders is too large to precisely
indicate future dangerousness. As legislative bodies continue to push sex offenders out,
by adding prohibited places or enlarging the zones around the prohibited places, reason
will win out over passion as the punitive intent of these laws becomes even more evident.
IX. A Better Solution
Merely keeping convicted sex offenders away from particular areas does nothing
to keep them away from children or any other potential victims. A key aspect of most
sex offenses is that the assailant and the victim often have a relationship with each other
before the violation occurs. The stranger danger for sex crimes is actually very low.
Whatever danger is posed, it is probably best handled by educating children how to act.181
And if there is a desire to separate children from child sexual offenders, then laws that
hinder relationship building, such as prohibiting a child sex offender from working at a
daycare or school, would be narrowly tailored, less restrictive and more effective.
A better solution to the problem would be to discontinue the process exiling the
convicted sex offenders from the general population once they have paid their debt to
society. If society is so certain that sex offenders have not paid enough, then perhaps the
incarceration time should increase. At a minimum, some sort of rehabilitation and
treatment should be used throughout the confinement period so that society could better
trust that the person leaving the penitentiary is changed from the one who entered.
Preventing offenders from being able to reasonably assimilate back into the general
population does not serve any legitimate purpose other than making politicians feel like
they are tough on crime.
Instead of simply hoping that incarceration for any length of time will rehabilitate
a sex offender, a more prudent approach would be to provide some comprehensive
counseling while incarcerated, so that whenever a sex offender is released we can put our
faith in the belief that they will not re-offend instead of setting up arbitrary barriers that
debilitate any hope of assimilation. Alternatively, sex offenders could spend the last
portion of their sentence in a sex offender halfway house where they could receive the
counseling and assistance needed to rejoin society and overcome any deviant urges.182 It
is presumptively unfair to punish someone for the status crime of being a sex offender
rather than for the underlying crime that made them a sex offender to begin with. Giving
first- time offenders probation with little or no jail time but sentencing them to a felony
when they fail to move from a house they have lived in for the past 10 years without
179

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (concurring opinion).
Jill Young Miller, Sex Offender Law Muddled, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, July 26, 2006 at A1,
A9.
181
A greater danger for children may come from internet chat-room stalkers. Some of NBC Dateline’s
most popular shows involve catching child predators. Residence and Employment restrictions would not
solve this problem at all. Except by keeping some sex offenders unemployed it gives them more time to
chat.
182
For example in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Alpha Human Services offers an Adult Residential Program
specifically designed for repeat sexual offenders. See www.alphaservices.org for more information.
180
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incident does not cure any problem. It is merely a means by which sex offenders can be
punished a second time for their crime without running afoul of any double jeopardy
claims.
If it can be proven that a particular amount of time is necessary to rehabilitate,
then that amount of time should be the minimum time required to be spent by all
noteworthy sex offenders. Releasing individuals before they are competent to control
their anti-social desires and creating a massive system to monitor and track them until the
inevitable day occurs when they re-offend is not in society’s best interest. Once a person
has served his full sentence his debt to society is paid. He or she now owes society
nothing for his past actions -- only the promise to live debt-free henceforth. If the
current punishment is not sufficient, then it must be increased so that society will receive
its payment upfront, not after the fact. Residence and employment restrictions re-punish
those who do not deserve additional punishment. That practice is contrary to our ordered
scheme of liberty and must seize. The time has come for the courts to protect the
interests of this helpless group and end this practice.
There is no arguing the fact that sex crimes are terrible. But so are lots of
different crimes. Everyone makes mistakes.183 It seems that for this broad spectrum of
crimes there is a one-strike-and-you’re-out policy. With recidivism so low and the
likelihood of repentance high, it is a shame that people like Lori Sue Collins are treated
as lepers. The good in her is ignored as she is cast out, away from society and forced into
a nomadic existence by a twenty-first century lynch mob. If there is no redemption
possible for sex offenders, then why not act accordingly and lock them up forever or
execute them. If not, no matter how much we hate the sin, we have to reach out to the
sinner. We must offer sex offenders real hope, because without hope, an individual will
act without conscious; then everyone loses.

183

“For all have sinned and fall short of the Glory of God” Romans 3:23 (New American Standard).
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES
State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Alabama

Persons convicted
of a “criminal sex
offense”184

Arkansas

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender AND
who are assigned
risk level 3 (high)
or 4 (SVP)187
Persons convicted
of certain sex
offenses involving
a child under
16191
Persons convicted
of certain sex
offenses involving
a child under
16194
Persons required
to register as a sex
offender197

Within 2,000 feet
of any school or
child care
facility185
Within 2,000 feet
of any elementary
or secondary
school or daycare
facility188

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life186

Possibility
of release?
No

15 years to
life189

Yes190

Within 500 feet of
the property of
any school192

Life193

No

Within 1,000 feet
of any school, day
care center, park,
or playground195

Life196

No

Within 1,000 feet
of any child care
facility, church,
school, or area
where minors
congregate198

10 years to
life199

Yes200

184

ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (2006) (effective Sept. 1, 1999).
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a).
186
ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a).
187
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (Michie 2006) (effective July 16, 2003).
188
Id.
189
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-919(a), (b)(1).
190
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-917(h), 919(b)(1), 922(b)(1)(a). A sex offender may request an administrative review
challenging the level 3 or 4 risk assignment, request a risk reassessment every five years, and petition a court for
release from registration requirements after 15 years. By lowering the risk classification to level 1 or 2, or obtaining
release from registration requirements, a sex offender will no longer be subject to the residence restriction.
191
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(b)(4) (2006) (effective July 25, 1995).
192
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(a)(1).
193
The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the
restriction lasts indefinitely.
194
FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006) (effective Oct. 1, 2004).
195
Id.
196
The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the
restriction lasts indefinitely.
197
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
198
Id. Georgia’s sex offender residency prohibition was amended in 2006 to 1) make it a crime to loiter within the
prohibited zone, 2) include “churches” among the restricted areas, and 3) add school bus stops and public/community
swimming pools to the definition of “area where minors congregate.” See Act No. 571, 2006 Ga. Laws (HB 1059).
199
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g).
200
Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from registration requirements after 10
years. If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to the residence restriction.
185
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES
(CONTINUED)
State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Idaho

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender201

Illinois

Persons convicted
of a child sex
offense, or
certified as a
sexually
dangerous person
whose victim was
under 18205
Persons required
to register as a sex
offender who are
1) sexually
violent predators,
or 2) have been
convicted of
certain offenses
involving a
minor209
Persons who have
committed a
criminal,
aggravated,
sexually violent,
or other offense
involving a
minor213

Within 500 feet of
the property on
which a school is
located202
Within 500 feet of
any school that
persons under the
age of 18 attend206

Indiana

Iowa

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
10 years to
life203

Possibility
of release?
Yes204

Life207

No208

Within 1,000 feet
of school
property, a youth
program center, or
public park210

10 years to
life211

Yes212

Within 2,000 feet
of a elementary or
secondary school
or child care
facility214

Life215

No

201

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1)(d).
203
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1).
204
Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release from registration
requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the residence restriction.
205
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5), (c)(1) (2006) (effective July 7, 2000).
206
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5).
207
The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the
restriction lasts indefinitely.
208
A “sexually dangerous person” may appeal the designation. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/9. But, even if successful, the
offender will remain subject to the residence prohibition if his/her underlying conviction is a qualifying child sex
offense.
209
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11(a) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
210
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11(c).
211
IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-19.
212
Id. The duty to register, and consequently the residence restriction, terminates after 10 years for certain offenders. A
sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status removed 10 years after the initial classification.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g).
213
IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(1), (2) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2002).
214
IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(2).
215
The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the
restriction lasts indefinitely.
202
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES
(CONTINUED)
State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Kentucky

Persons required
to register as a
sex offender216

Louisiana

Sexually violent
predators220

Michigan

Persons required
to register as a
sex offender224
Persons required
to register as a
sex offender228

Within 1,000 feet
of a school,
preschool, public
playground, or
day care facility217
Within 1,000 feet
of any elementary
or secondary
school, day care,
playground, youth
center, public
swimming pool,
or free standing
video arcade221
Within 1,000 feet
of school
property225
Within 1,500 feet
of any elementary
or secondary
school or child
care facility229
Within 1,000 feet
of any school or
childcare
facility233

Mississippi

Missouri

Persons convicted
of certain sex
offenses232

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
20 years to
life218

Possibility
of release?
Yes219

Life222

No223

10 years to
life226

Yes227

10 years to
life230

Yes231

Life234

No

216

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(1) (West 2006) (effective July 12, 2006).
Id.
218
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.520(2)(a), (3).
219
Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements,
and consequently the residence restriction, after 20 years.
220
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (West 2006) (effective June 28, 2001).
221
Id.
222
The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the
restriction lasts indefinitely.
223
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1 (containing no provision for reconsideration of the SVP classification after the
sentencing court makes the initial determination). Section 2 of Acts 1999, No. 594 repealed paragraph (B)(4) of this
section which allowed the defendant to petition the sentencing court annually for review of the SVP designation.
224
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(1) (2006) (effective Jan. 1, 2006).
225
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.735(1), 733(f).
226
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7).
227
Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements,
and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 to 25 years.
228
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4)(a) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
229
Id.
230
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-47(2)(a).
231
Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release from registration
requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the residence restriction.
232
MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(1) (West 2006) (effective June 14, 2004).
233
Id.
234
The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the
restriction lasts indefinitely.
217
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES
(CONTINUED)
State

Residence
prohibition
applies to:

What is the
prohibited zone?

Ohio

Persons convicted
of a sexually
oriented offense
or child-victim
oriented
offense235
Persons registered
as a sex
offender238

Within 1,000 feet
of any school
premises236

Oklahoma

South
Dakota

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender242

Tennessee

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender whose
victim was a
minor246

Virginia

Adults convicted
of certain sex
offenses where
the offender is
more than 3 years
older than the
victim250

Within 2,000 feet
of any school,
educational
institution, park,
playground, or
childcare
facility239
Within 500 feet of
any school, public
park, playground,
or public pool243
Within 1,000 feet
of any school, day
care/child care
facility, public
park, playground,
recreation center,
or athletic field247
Within 500 feet of
the premises of a
child day center,
or primary,
secondary, or high
school251

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life237

Possibility
of release?
No

10 years to
life240

Yes241

10 years to
life244

Yes245

10 years to
life248

Yes249

Life252

No

235

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (West 2006) (effective July 31, 2003).
Id.
237
The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the
restriction lasts indefinitely.
238
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006) (effective Nov. 1, 2003).
239
Id.
240
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J).
241
Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements,
and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 years.
242
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
243
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-23, 22-24B-22(1).
244
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-27.
245
Id. A sex offender may petition a court 10 years after conviction for release from the residency restriction.
246
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006) (effective June 8, 2004).
247
Id.
248
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1).
249
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(c). Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition the Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation for release from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be
subject to the residence restriction.
250
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
251
Id.
252
Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from residing” within the prohibited zone.
236
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TABLE 2 – PENALTIES FOR RESIDING WITHIN PROHIBITED ZONE
State

Felony/Misdemeanor

Punishment 1st Violation

Alabama

Class C felony253

Arkansas

Class D felony256

Delaware

Class G felony259

Florida

Georgia265

First degree
misdemeanor or third
degree felony
depending on the
degree of punishment
for the qualifying sex
offense262
Felony

Imprisonment,
1 to 10
years254
Imprisonment,
up to 6
years257
Imprisonment,
up to 2
years260
Misdemeanor,
imprisonment
up to 1 year;
felony,
imprisonment
up to 5
years263
Imprisonment,
10 to 30 years

Idaho

Misdemeanor266

Illinois

Class 4 felony269

Indiana

Class D felony272

Imprisonment,
up to 6
months, fine
up to $1,000,
or both267
Imprisonment,
1 to 3 years270
Imprisonment,
6 months to 3
years, and fine
not more than
$10,000273

Mental
Element

Punishment
-2nd or
Subsequent
Violations
Same

Knowingly255

Same

Knowingly258

Same

Strict
Liability261

Same

Strict
Liability264

Same

Knowingly

Same

Strict
Liability268

Same

Knowingly271

Same

Knowingly,
intentionally274

253

ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(h) (2006).
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6(a)(3).
255
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(h).
256
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(d) (Michie 2006).
257
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(5).
258
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(d).
259
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(a)(1) (2006).
260
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(7).
261
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
262
FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006).
263
FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d), (4)(a).
264
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
265
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (2006).
266
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006).
267
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-113(1).
268
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
269
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(d) (2006).
270
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a)(7).
271
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5).
272
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11 (West 2006).
273
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7(a).
274
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11.
254
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TABLE 2 – PENALTIES FOR RESIDING WITHIN PROHIBITED ZONE
(CONTINUED)
State

Felony/Misdemeanor

Punishment 1st Violation

Iowa

Aggravated
misdemeanor275

Kentucky

First violation is a
Class A misdemeanor.
Second or subsequent
violation is a Class D
felony.278
Misdemeanor

Imprisonment,
up to 2 years,
and fine of
$500 to
$5,000276
Imprisonment,
up to 1 year279

Louisiana282

Michigan284

Mississippi286

Missouri

First violation is a
misdemeanor. Second
or subsequent
violation is a felony.
Felony

First violation is a
class D felony.
Second or subsequent
violation is a class B
felony.288

Imprisonment,
up to 6
months, fine
not to exceed
$1,000, or
both
Imprisonment
up to 1 year,
$1,000 fine,
or both
Imprisonment
up to 5 years,
fine up to
$5,000, or
both
Imprisonment,
up to 4
years289

Punishment 2nd or
Subsequent
Violations
Same

Mental
Element

Imprisonment,
1 to 5 years280

Strict
Liability281

Same

Strict
Liability283

Imprisonment
up to 2 years,
$2,000 fine,
or both
Same

Strict
Liability285

Imprisonment,
5 to 15
years290

Strict
Liability277

Strict
Liability287

Strict
Liability291

275

IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(3) (West 2006).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(2).
277
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
278
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(3) (West 2006).
279
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.090(1).
280
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060(2)(d).
281
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
282
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(E) (West 2006).
283
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
284
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(2)(a), (b) (2006).
285
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
286
MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-33(2) (2006).
287
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
288
MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(4) (West 2006).
289
MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.011(1).
290
Id.
291
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
276
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TABLE 2 – PENALTIES FOR RESIDING WITHIN PROHIBITED ZONE
(CONTINUED)
State

Felony/Misdemeanor

Punishment 1st Violation

Ohio292

A person who violates
the prohibition is
subject to an action
for injunctive relief
Misdemeanor

Injunction

Oklahoma294

South
Dakota

First violation is a
class 6 felony;
subsequent violations
are class 5 felonies295

Tennessee

Class E felony299

Virginia

Class 6 felony302

Fine not to
exceed $3,000
Imprisonment
for 2 years, or
fine of
$4,000, or
both296
Imprisonment,
1 to 6 years300
Imprisonment,
1 to 5 years;
or, jail up to
12 months
and fine up to
$2,500303

Punishment 2nd or
Subsequent
Violations
Injunction

One year in
county jail in
addition to the
fine
Imprisonment
for 5 years.
Optional fine
of $10,000.297

Mental
Element
Strict
Liability293
Willfully,
intentionally
Strict
Liability298

Same

Knowingly301

Same

Knowingly304

292

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(B) (West 2006).
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
294
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006).
295
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006).
296
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1(9).
297
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1(8).
298
The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred.
299
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(e) (2006).
300
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-112.
301
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a).
302
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006).
303
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f).
304
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A).
293

33

TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
State

Employment
prohibition
applies to:

Alabama

Persons convicted
of a “criminal sex
offense”305

Alabama

Persons convicted
of a criminal sex
offense involving
a child308

Florida

Sexual
predators311

Georgia

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender315

Georgia

Sexually
dangerous
predators319

Where is the
offender
prohibited from
working?
Within 2,000 feet
of any school or
child care
facility306
Within 500 feet of
any school, child
care facility, park,
athletic field or
facility, or other
business or facility
having a principal
purpose of caring
for, educating, or
entertaining
minors309
At any business,
school, day care
center, park,
playground, or
other place where
children regularly
congregate312
Within 1,000 feet
of any child care
facility, school, or
church316
Within 1,000 feet
of an area where
minors
congregate320

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
Life307

Possibility
of release?
No

Life310

No

30 years to
life313

Yes314

10 years to
life317

Yes318

Life321

No

305

ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (2006).
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a).
307
ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a).
308
ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(g), 15-20-21(1).
309
ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(g).
310
ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a).
311
FLA. STAT. § 775.21(10)(b) (2006).
312
Id.
313
FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6)(l).
314
Id. A sexual predator may petition a court for removal of the sexual predator designation 30 years after release.
315
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(1) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
316
Id.
317
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g).
318
Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from registration requirements after 10
years. If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to the employment restriction.
319
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(2) (effective July 1, 2006).
320
Id. “Area where minors congregate” includes: public and private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating
rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and public/community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. §
42-1-12(a)(3).
321
See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14 (effective July 1, 2006) (containing no provisions for reconsideration of the “sexually
dangerous predator” designation after the initial determination is final).
306
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TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
(CONTINUED)
State

Employment
prohibition
applies to:

Idaho

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender322

Indiana

Sexually violent
predators326

Michigan

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender330
Persons convicted
of a “listed [sex]
offense”334

Michigan

Oklahoma

Registered sex
offenders336

Where is the
offender
prohibited from
working?
At a day care
center, group day
care facility, or
family day care
home323
On school
property, at youth
program centers,
or public parks327
Within 1,000 feet
of school
property331
By a school or
allowed to work
under contract in a
school335
To work with or
provide services to
children or work
on school
premises337

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
10 years to
life324

Possibility
of release?
Yes325

10 years to
life328

Yes329

10 years to
life332

Yes333

N/A

N/A

10 years to
life338

Yes339

322

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8327(1) (2006).
Id.
324
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1).
325
After 10 years, a sex offender may 1) if not required to register for life, petition a court for release from registration
requirements, and 2) petition a court for relief from the employment prohibition. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8310(1), 188328. If successful with either petition, the offender will no longer be subject to the employment restriction.
326
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-10(b) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
327
Id.
328
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g).
329
Id. A sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status removed 10 years after the initial
classification.
330
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.734(1)(a) (2006).
331
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.734(1)(a), 28.733(f).
332
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7).
333
Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements,
and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 to 25 years.
334
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1230a(10).
335
Id. Interestingly, the statute gives discretion to the school board to approve the hiring of a non-sex felon, but not a
sex offender.
336
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 589(A) (West 2006).
337
Id.
338
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J).
339
Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements,
and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 years.
323
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TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
(CONTINUED)
State

Employment
prohibition
applies to:

Tennessee

Persons required
to register as a sex
offender whose
victim was a
minor340

Virginia

Adults convicted
of certain sex
offenses where
the offender is
more than 3 years
older than the
victim344

Where is the
offender
prohibited from
working?
Within 1,000 feet
of any school, day
care/child care
facility, public
park, playground,
recreation center,
or athletic field341
On public or
private elementary
or secondary
school or child
day care center
property345

How long is
an offender
subject to the
restriction?
10 years to
life342

Life346

Possibility
of release?
Yes343

No

340

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006).
Id.
342
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1).
343
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(c). Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition the Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation for release from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be
subject to the employment restriction.
344
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.4(A) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006).
345
Id.
346
Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from working” in the prohibited area.
341
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Appendix 1: http://www.webstercity.com/departments/police_dept/692a.2a_map.asp
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